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ABSTRACT. The present contribution offers a defence of open borders. It pres-
ents a critique of the idea that the state has a justified claim to regulate the 
movement of people because they reflect the collective endeavours of the mem-
bers of the state to pursue a shared project of self-rule or self-determination. It 
argues that this view rests on an indefensible understanding of the nature of the 
state, which should be viewed less as a collective endeavour than as a product 
of conflicts among political elites. There is a strong prima facie case for free 
movement that suggests there should be a presumption in favour of open bor-
ders. The argument from self-determination is not a sound basis for justifying 
restrictions on the movement of people.
KEYWORDS. Immigration, state, self-determination, justice, political community
I. INTRODUCTION
In debates about immigration, one position that has little prospect of being adopted by any government, major political party, or significant 
advocacy group, is the view that the movement of people between states 
should be completely free. The idea that there should be no restrictions 
on people leaving or entering any country is generally regarded as politi-
cally naïve, if not entirely preposterous. In academic circles, there is gener-
ally much more sympathy for the open borders view, but this seems only 
to confirm that its advocates are out of touch, and that such defences of 
free movement could only be advanced from an ivory tower. Even among 
academic proponents of less restrictive immigration controls, many think 
it would be more defensible – and indeed, sensible – to argue for borders 
that are more porous rather than simply open. Given that the prospect of 
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removing immigration controls altogether is remote, one might well ask 
the advocate of open borders: why bother?
My purpose here is to address the question by taking issue not so 
much with the advocates of closed borders as with the reticent friends 
of free (or at least, freer) movement. The arguments I wish to consider 
are not those of people who are fearful or sceptical about the merits 
of high levels of immigration, but of others who see the value of 
free movement yet maintain that restrictions are warranted all the 
same. Some of these theorists are contributors to, or draw significantly 
from, an emerging literature in political theory on territorial rights. In 
defending the ethical justifiability of the territorial state, they typically 
uphold as fundamental the right of the state to exclude outsiders from 
its territory. Though not all of them are interested primarily in immi-
gration, they have developed arguments that are central to the issue of 
the openness of borders (Miller 2008; 2009; Meisels 2009; Stilz 2011; 
Nine 2012).
However, an especially important critique of open borders has been 
advanced from this perspective by Ryan Pevnick, who argues for the 
reduction of immigration restrictions, but aims to strike a balance between 
open borders and “absolute sovereignty” (2011 passim). Much of this 
article addresses Pevnick’s concerns. His most important contention is 
that the advocates of open borders err in failing to recognize the signifi-
cance of the fact that the state is a kind of political community. It is, he 
says, “a historical project that extends across generations” (2011, 38); and 
this fact tells against proposals that fail to recognize the legitimate claims 
of communities to protect their collective life, and pursue their shared 
endeavour. I wish to suggest, however, that we view this idea with scep-
ticism, if not outright suspicion. Seeing why will enable us better to appre-
ciate that the critique of open borders, even at its strongest, rests on weak 
foundations. More importantly, it should help us see why open borders 
are worth defending, even if the prospects for complete success in the 
real world are limited.
95922_EthPersp_2012/4_03_Kukathas.indd   650 22/11/12   13:26
— 651 —
Ethical Perspectives 19 (2012) 4
CHANDRAN KUKATHAS – WHY OPEN BORDERS?
Much of the argument that follows turns on what amounts to a form 
of sociological analysis. A primary concern here is to show that contem-
porary discussions of the claims of the state to regulate movement rest 
on assumptions about the nature of the state that need to be questioned. 
Despite the many critiques of the state that have been developed by 
Marxists, postmodernists and realists – as well as libertarians and 
anarchists of various stripes – a substantial strand of liberal democratic 
theory continues to operate on the understanding that the state is 
a reflection or manifestation of our capacity for collective self-rule 
and self-determination, rather than an institution of domination by self-
serving elites. One common response to such a critique has been for 
many contemporary theorists to say that they are not concerned so much 
with what actual states are like but with how states ought to be. The 
underlying assumption of the present contribution is that this move is 
not defensible, for any discussion of ethical issues involving such institu-
tions as the state needs to take the historical reality they embody much 
more seriously.
Our argument is presented in four main sections. It begins with a 
discussion of the meaning of open borders to make clear what it is at 
issue. I then consider the prima facie case for free movement, and explain 
why there should be a strong presumption in favour of open borders. I 
next turn to Pevnick’s treatment of the issue and explain why it presents 
an important critique of unrestricted movement. I follow this with a 
critique of Pevnick’s view of the open borders issue and I conclude with 
some more general reflections on the case for open borders.
II. THE MEANING OF OPEN BORDERS
Since we live in a world of states, and modern states are all territorially 
defined entities with geographic boundaries recognized under interna-
tional law1, we clearly do not live in a borderless world. To advocate open 
borders is to argue not for the elimination of borders, but for changes in 
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how they are understood and how they affect those who might move 
across them.2
Borders are political constructions demarcating distinct and separate 
jurisdictions. Crossing a border does not always take one beyond the 
reach of the authority of any other jurisdictions, but it always means com-
ing under the authority (even if only temporarily) of one other. To enter 
a jurisdiction is to assume certain liabilities (those that go with being 
subject to the laws of that territory), as well as to acquire any rights that 
go with being an inhabitant of the area. A border is open to the extent 
that persons are able to enter the jurisdiction it defines and acquire rights 
or exercise their freedom to act therein.
The openness of a border is not merely a matter of whether or not 
people may freely cross it in order to enter a jurisdiction. It is also a mat-
ter of what they may do once they have entered. If mere entry were suf-
ficient, then most countries in the world could be said to have open 
borders, since few deny outsiders the opportunity to visit as tourists, and 
many grant foreigners rights of transit (whether as international airline 
pilots or merchant seamen, for example), or give them permission to stay 
temporarily (as sportsmen, or scholars, or performers, to name just a few 
cases). The openness of a border must be judged, in part, by the extent 
to which outsiders are permitted to enter, participate in the life of, and 
remain in the society that the border circumscribes.3 A border is more 
open if people are free not only to enter for brief visits but also to reside, 
to work, to settle, and perhaps even to join the political community that 
border helps to define.
The openness of a border is thus determined, at least in part, by the 
rights people can enjoy upon entering a country or a state (Kukathas 
2011). However, it may be no less important to consider not only the 
legal rights someone might acquire on entry, but also the extent to which 
such a person is able to get along without such rights. If the requirement 
to comply with immigration laws is enforced only weakly, regimes with 
restrictive laws that are poorly policed might have borders that are more 
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open de facto than regimes with generous provisions for foreign participa-
tion that are strictly monitored.
The more onerous it becomes to enter and settle in a society, the less 
open are its borders. A state could thus make its borders more closed by 
any of a variety (of combinations) of measures. It could demand that only 
visa holders may enter, or study, or work; it may limit the number or the 
duration or the transferability of work visas; it may raise the qualification 
requirements or the price of entry visas and deny or limit the rights of 
accompanying family members to work; and it may restrict the rights of 
entrants to acquire property. Without changing any immigration laws, it 
could make borders less open by building fences or walls, hiring more 
security guards, increasing the surveillance of employers to ensure that 
they do not take on foreign workers without authorization, and punishing 
transgressions (by citizens and foreigners alike) with less compromise. 
Equally, it is quite possible to have weakly enforced border controls in 
some respects along with very vigilant and even punitive controls in 
others: a nation that is poor at controlling entry might nonetheless deport 
people in large numbers or even conduct mass expulsions. Assessing the 
openness of a border requires careful examination of a variety of relevant 
factors.
To argue for open borders, then, is not simply to call for an increase 
in immigration. It is to call for the removal of a range of restrictions on 
the movement of people from one jurisdiction into another. The removal 
of such restrictions is not simply a matter of eliminating barriers to (mere) 
entry, but of transforming the terms and conditions under which people 
move.
There is, however, one further aspect to the question that needs to 
be clarified. To move from one jurisdiction to another may involve leav-
ing one kind of association and joining or becoming a member of another. 
But entering a territory and taking part in its life is not the same as 
becoming a member of a particular group or entity, and need not involve 
joining anything (Guest 2011). This is important to bear in mind because, 
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all too often, discussions of immigration or free movement assume that 
it is membership that is the crucial issue (Walzer 1983, chapter 1). Yet 
this is only one aspect of the matter, important though it may be.
III. A PRESUMPTION IN FAVOUR OF FREE MOVEMENT
Although there is a strong tendency in debates about immigration and 
population movements to begin with a presumption in favour of the 
claims of states and citizens, we should begin the analysis here with a 
presumption in favour of free movement and, consequently, of open 
borders. In ethical matters generally, it is intervention or interference in 
the activities of others that requires justification, for we take it that we 
need good reasons to deny anyone his or her freedom, and very strong 
reasons to exercise force to prevent a person from acting (Benn 1988). 
One of the strongest reasons we can offer is that such a person, in exer-
cising his or her freedom, would deny freedom to another. Restrictions 
on movement generally, and across borders in particular, limit freedom, 
both because they prevent foreigners from travelling to visit, work or 
reside in a country they would otherwise have the opportunity to go to, 
and because they prevent citizens and residents of a country from engag-
ing with those foreigners they wish to meet, employ, or befriend. Given 
the benefits that accrue to citizens and foreigners alike from enabling 
people to relate freely to one another, some very good reasons will be 
needed to justify preventing them from doing so.
The strength of the presumption in favour of free movement seems 
all the greater, however, when one considers the many positive benefits 
that would come with a world of open borders. The most obvious is the 
substantial contribution it would make to the reduction, and even eradica-
tion, of global poverty. A number of mechanisms would make this pos-
sible. First, gains from trade would create greater wealth, from which the 
poorest would benefit most either because they could move to societies 
that paid them more for their labour or because local wages would rise if 
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many workers moved to take advantage of opportunities abroad. Locals 
would also benefit from the remittances from relatives abroad that even 
now form a substantial portion of the income of many poor communi-
ties. Rich and poor alike would gain from an increase in general prosper-
ity, but in these circumstances most of the gains would be captured by 
the poor rather than by elites.
The importance of this should not be underestimated. According to 
Michael Clemens, the “gains from eliminating migration barriers dwarf 
– by an order of magnitude or two – the gains from eliminating other 
types of barriers. For the elimination of trade policy barriers and capital 
flow barriers, the estimated gains amount to less than a few percent of 
world GDP. For labor mobility barriers, the estimated gains are often in 
the range of 50-150 percent of world GDP” (2011, 84).4 If even modest 
gains in labour mobility can yield trillions of dollars in benefits – and 
benefits that would go disproportionately to the worst-off in the world 
– some very good reasons would have to be offered to restrict the move-
ment of people.5
The depth of this challenge to the advocate of restrictions on move-
ment becomes even more apparent, however, if we add to these consid-
erations of economic advantage some reflections on the immediate prac-
tical effect of immigration controls on individual persons. While legal 
barriers and the threat of sanctions will deter the timid and the law-
abiding, millions will nonetheless continue to try to cross borders even 
when states say they are not welcome. To deal with this, a system of 
police, prisons, courts, and public officials will be kept in place, and 
would-be immigrants unable to evade the law will become criminalized 
– even if only in the sense that their otherwise peaceful efforts to make 
better lives for themselves will be deemed unlawful. The depth of suffer-
ing this causes should not be set aside, for the cost is not trivial. Even 
those who move with the permission of the law must be monitored to 
ensure they comply with rules designed to separate, carefully, desirable 
from undesirable immigrants, so all must pay some price in anxiety and 
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lost time. For those whose status is difficult to determine, the price can 
be a life in limbo for months or years. For those who fall foul of bureau-
cratic indifference or confusion, there may be detention, deportation, and 
ruined lives. A policy that required such a system to be put in place would 
have to yield very great benefits to be justified.6
How, then, might restrictions on immigration, or free movement 
more generally, be justified? It is difficult to come up with a universal 
defence of restrictions on movement from the perspective of individuals 
or peoples since it looks unlikely that any good economic or ethical argu-
ment can be found that would work for everyone, regardless of where 
they are. An argument for limiting the free movement of persons will 
always be an argument offered to explain why particular (sometimes 
advantaged) groups should be protected in their enjoyment of the rents 
they have secured by having the relative good fortune to reside in one 
part of the world rather than another.
Several kinds of reasons might be offered, but most are unconvinc-
ing. The most prominent are reasons of distributive justice. Here, the 
argument is that freedom of movement advances the interests of the 
global poor and the local rich at the expense of the local poor – who bear 
the brunt of competition with foreign workers for scarce jobs and under-
supplied social services. There is a dilemma confronting citizens of 
wealthy states, according to Stephen Macedo, because we in the host 
countries must weigh the competing interests of foreigners on the one 
hand and our fellow citizens on the other (Macedo 2007). While some of 
those foreigners may have claims of justice because immigration offers 
them hope of escape from poverty, our least well-off fellow citizens also 
have substantial claims to protection from the effects of immigration. To 
the extent that migrants compete for jobs with the low-skilled, and 
depress the wages of the poor (thereby exacerbating the inequalities 
between rich and poor in the nation), they are a cause of social injustice 
within states that admit them. Doing justice to our fellow citizens, it is 
implied (and sometimes asserted), is at least as important as doing justice 
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to the world’s poor. Perhaps it is even more important (Brimelow 1994; 
2007; Borjas 1999).
This argument is unconvincing as an argument of justice, since it 
suggests that when there are competing considerations about whose inter-
ests to serve, we should attend to the interests of the less badly-off rather 
than the worst-off. If the argument is an argument about the justice of 
the background rules, it cannot be a requirement of justice that some 
groups be privileged. If foreign workers are to be kept out in order to 
maintain higher wage levels for domestic labour, it cannot be argued that 
this is just; it can only be argued that other considerations, such as group 
or national loyalty trump considerations of justice or freedom.7 
Even then, the argument is not compelling. Keeping out foreign 
labour may keep local wages higher and benefit domestic labour; but the 
costs may well be borne by other citizens, who will have to endure the 
higher prices that are the consequence of higher wage costs. As is often 
the case, the burden will fall most heavily on the poorest, even though its 
impact may be mitigated by institutional arrangements protecting the 
worst-off. If this is to be justified, it is hard to see how it might be 
defended as a matter of justice. Immigration restrictions do have redis-
tributive consequences; but while it is clear that the foreign poor are 
harmed, it is also evident that not all members of the domestic poor 
benefit.
To defend restrictions on the movement of people it is necessary to 
show that what is warranted is the protection of particular kinds of peo-
ple, or of particular kinds of group, like the nation or state. Several kinds 
of argument might be mounted here: arguments from the importance of 
preserving national identity; arguments from the need to secure social 
trust; and arguments from the value of cultural authenticity.8 The empir-
ical basis of these claims has been seriously challenged, notably by Will 
Kymlicka and Keith Banting (2006). These arguments are also carefully 
addressed by Pevnick, who, on the whole, finds them wanting – just as 
he finds the arguments from distributive justice not wholly persuasive.
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The argument from national identity confronts the following dilemma 
(Pevnick 2011, 133-141). If the advocates of immigration restrictions wish 
to restrict on the basis of a thin conception of the cultural distinctiveness 
of national identity – one that sees identity as given by little more than a 
shared language and commitment to democratic institutions – the ten-
dency of immigrants to assimilate suggests that there is little reason to 
limit either the numbers or source of people coming to settle. A thin 
conception of identity is difficult to undermine. On the other hand, if 
advocates of restrictive immigration adopt a thick or robust notion of 
national identity, it will be difficult to operate any policy that was not 
grounded in some form of racial, ethnic, religious, or broadly cultural 
profiling – which would be difficult in the case of most countries, since 
they are already internally diverse.9
The argument from social trust faces different difficulties (Pevnick 
2011, 154-162). Here the claim is that immigration undermines the social 
trust necessary to sustain major social institutions, since a population is 
less likely to support, for example, welfare institutions, if the benefits are 
seen as going to outsiders rather than fellow citizens. The main problem 
with this argument is that the evidence for it is ambiguous at best. The 
negative effects of diversity are not significant and tend to wither away 
over time. No less importantly, however, it is not clear why any tendency 
on the part of the population to withdraw its support for its social insti-
tutions in the face of increased immigration justifies immigration restric-
tions – unless those institutions are unjustifiable in principle. Perhaps any 
decline in domestic support for social institutions as a consequence of 
increased and more diverse immigration is best met by reform of those 
institutions or by further efforts to explain to the public why support is 
warranted.
Ryan Pevnick offers some of the most powerful arguments ever 
made by a political theorist in defence of more open immigration. 
Much of the force of his analysis derives from the critique he offers of 
advocates of restrictive policies. Nonetheless, Pevnick rejects open 
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borders as a defensible idea, arguing that neither the beneficial conse-
quences of immigration nor the weakness of many justifications for 
immigration restrictions suffices to justify the abandonment of immi-
gration controls altogether. We should examine Pevnick’s argument 
more closely to consider whether a presumption in favour of free 
movement might be turned into a more conclusive argument in defence 
of open borders.
IV. PEVNICK’S CRITIQUE OF OPEN BORDERS
In spite of his general sympathy with the lifting of many restrictions on 
the free movement of people, Ryan Pevnick rejects open borders as a 
defensible ethical ideal. His fundamental claim is that political communi-
ties have the right to self-determination, and from this, he maintains, 
follow a number of conclusions about the way in which the state may 
rightfully control its territory. Open borders are inconsistent with this 
understanding of political community, which provides the most appropri-
ate framework for considering a range of policy questions, including ques-
tions about immigration. The right of self-determination is not unlimited, 
and does not justify everything states might try to do in the name of 
political community, but it is enough, he thinks, to make plain that open 
borders is an unsustainable ideal.
At the core of Pevnick’s argument is an understanding of the state 
as a political community, and of the political community as a “historical 
project that extends across generations and into which individuals are 
born” (2011, 38). According to this view,
[t]he state is very largely a result of the labor and investment of the 
community. The citizenry raises resources through taxation and invests 
those resources in valuable public goods: basic infrastructure, defense, 
establishment and maintenance of an effective market, a system of 
education, and the like […] these are goods that only exist as a result 
of the labor and investment of community members (2011, 38). 
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Pevnick invokes Abraham Lincoln to advance the view that those 
members of a political community who have perished (whether on the 
battlefield or from more mundane causes) bequeathed institutions to 
the current generation, which is now entrusted with the task of pre-
serving and passing them on to the generations to come (2011, 39).10 
This is a view he also attributes to Rawls, for whom, he says, “the 
fundamental organizing idea of democratic theory is that of ‘society as 
a fair system of cooperation over time, from one generation to the 
next’” (Pevnick 2011, 39; Rawls 1993, 15). His overall purpose is to 
develop an account of political community as an intergenerational 
enterprise that can also be understood as an ‘associative ownership 
framework’.
The two aspects to this analysis are equally important. For Pevnick, 
the political community owns its institutions and its territory, but this can 
only be understood as the result of a historical process in which state insti-
tutions are brought into existence by a “concerted collective effort” (2011, 
39). Recognizing the importance of self-determination depends upon 
appreciating both that political community is a form of collective owner-
ship and that it is an inheritance. Ownership claims do not trump all other 
considerations, since owners may have substantial duties to others for all 
kinds of reasons. States may, for example, have duties to asylum-seekers 
that issues of ownership cannot diminish. However, the fact that people 
and states have duties to help others in distress in no way casts doubts 
on the legitimacy of any political community, or its right to self-determi-
nation (2011, 40). Nor, for that matter, does any defect in the state’s past: 
the injustices committed by the state may well render it responsible for 
rectifying past wrongs, but they do not weaken its right of self-determi-
nation (2011, 41-43).
According to Pevnick’s account, the state is a political community 
and a jurisdiction, but it is also a collective owner of all that falls within 
its jurisdiction. Invoking Jeremy Waldron, he argues that the state is a 
system of collective property, such that “‘the community as a whole 
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determines how important resources are to be used. These determina-
tions are made on the basis of the social interest through mechanisms 
of collective decision-making’” (Pevnick 2011, 44; Waldron 2004). 
Through their associational relationships, members of such a community 
provide each other with a range of valuable goods, such as protection 
from internal and external threats, risk-protection schemes (pensions and 
healthcare), and facilitating programmes (such as public education). Since 
such goods exist only because of the “coordinated decisions, labor, and 
contributions of members,” these members are “in a position to legiti-
mately deny membership to some outsiders because this entitlement 
amounts to a prima facie privilege to do with it, within boundaries, what 
they wish” (2011, 53).
The advocates of open borders, in Pevnick’s understanding of the 
issue, are persons who “fail to appreciate the sense in which political 
communities are ongoing schemes of cooperation among members” 
(2011, 13). Such persons not only think that freedom of movement is 
highly desirable or beneficial, they also deny that states have any right 
to exclude others from entering or joining the political community. 
His rejection of open borders is therefore not a denial of the advan-
tages of open immigration or free movement – on the contrary, he 
emphasises against ‘statists’ the importance and value of immigration 
– but an assertion of the right of states to exclude. He takes advocates 
of open borders to be people who deny the very legitimacy of border 
controls.
One possible response the defender of open borders might give to 
Pevnick would be to accept that, both de facto and de jure, states have the 
right to exclude, so the issue is whether or not they should adopt policies 
of exclusion they are perfectly entitled to enforce. That is not, however, 
the reply I wish to offer here. Pevnick’s view needs to be questioned not 
only because of the great benefits open borders would bring, to rich and 
poor alike, but because the legitimacy of border controls is indeed ques-
tionable.
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V. CRITICISMS OF PEVNICK’S VIEW
The fundamental problem with Pevnick’s critique of open borders is that 
it rests on a mistaken understanding of the state, and of political com-
munity more generally. It is an image of the state that is neither histori-
cally accurate nor conceptually plausible. It is an account of the state that 
is very much a statement of contemporary, western, liberal democracy’s 
self-image, but it does not correctly describe even modern North Amer-
ican and Western European states, let alone the states of Asia and Africa.
Consider first the claim that the state is a historical project extending 
across generations. While it is true enough that states, like all human 
institutions, are the product of human action and interaction, they are 
hardly the fruit of the efforts of generations of people who could mean-
ingfully be described as engaged, consciously or otherwise, in a shared 
project. To the extent that any persons are so engaged, they are members 
of small political elites who have fostered institutional changes for a mix-
ture of motives, from personal ambition to financial interest to ideologi-
cal fervour. The vast majority of people are carried along by events, occa-
sionally co-opted to facilitate changes when popular support is needed, 
but just as often simply left with no choice but to go along with the 
outcomes that result from the triumph of one elite or another, or the 
compromises contending elites strike.11
A number of commonplace observations suggest how difficult it is 
to defend the idea of the state as a shared historical project. First, innu-
merable states do not survive for more than a few generations. Most of 
the states of Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia came into exis-
tence only in the twentieth century, the majority as a consequence of 
post-war decolonization. Very few of them have enjoyed stable political 
boundaries. Even Europe, the birthplace of the modern state, has seen 
continual re-drawings of boundaries as states have emerged, changed 
shape, and disappeared.12 At present there are in Europe 50 sovereign 
states, six partially recognized states, and six dependent territories, as well 
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as two special areas of internal sovereignty.13 In the course of its modern 
history, Europe encompassed hundreds of nations and city-states in the 
seventeenth century, and only twenty at the beginning of the twentieth. 
Second, hardly any states before the twentieth century were democracies, 
and there were few with mechanisms to ensure the accountability of rul-
ers to the wishes or interests of the general population. Meaningful par-
ticipation in the development of social and political institutions was lim-
ited to the elite. Even within democratic states, political structures mostly 
remain within elite control, though the extent of elite responsiveness has 
long been a subject of dispute (not only in politics but also in political 
science). This not to say that there may not be something to the Burkean 
view that Pevnick’s position resembles, since there is no doubt that tradi-
tions and institutions survive generations, or that elites looking to trample 
upon them ought to be viewed with suspicion. But to see in the continu-
ity of some political institutions evidence that states are shared projects 
is to take matters too far.
All too often, however, states do not so much develop out of the 
shared concerns of local populations as exploit and transform those pop-
ulations in order to suit their own interests and the ambitions of the elites 
that dominate the political process. There may be cases in which the state 
evolves organically out of civil society, but it has frequently acted as a 
predator, which has tried to bring order not so much to serve the inter-
ests of society as to facilitate its own extractive activities (Scott 1999; 
2010; Migdal 1988; 2011; Clastres 1987). Even if one sees state and soci-
ety as mutually constitutive, it would be too much to claim that the out-
come is the result of some shared concern rather than the product of 
contention among a range of forces and interests.
No less problematic is Pevnick’s account of the state as the result of 
the labour and investment of the community, with citizens raising 
resources through taxation and investing those resources in public goods, 
from national defence to education to the market system itself. As history, 
this presents a somewhat romantic vision of the place of taxation in the 
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lives of societies. For most of human history, going back to the ninth 
century BCE, the main purpose of taxation was to fund military conflict. 
The modern European state has for much of its history found itself strug-
gling against a population that was highly resistant to its demands for 
revenue, often to finance its wars (Wildavsky and Webber 1986; Burg 
2003). Nonetheless, the emergence of what Schumpeter famously called 
the “tax state”, brought about profound changes to society, reshaping not 
only its institutions of economic management but also its cultural norms 
(Schumpeter 1918). The modern state is in part the creature of its own 
fiscal structure, which has itself transformed society, international trade, 
and international relations. It is simplistic to suggest that states raise rev-
enues prompted by a civic-minded citizenry, intent on guiding them to 
provide public goods and services. States have fought wars of which 
citizens disapproved, and spent revenues on projects no one but the 
immediate beneficiaries of government funds have wanted. The distribu-
tion of the spoils of taxation requires a more sophisticated explanation.
Underlying all this, however, is a deeper problem with Pevnick’s 
general perspective. In his analysis, he presents a picture of the working 
of society as though society was somehow the construction of the polit-
ical community or the state. At the very least, it appears to be a structure 
that is organized or managed by the state. But such an understanding is 
neither historically justified nor sociologically plausible. Societies precede, 
and generally survive, states and other forms of political organization, 
which come and go. To be sure, some societies have been eradicated, by 
violence or disease, or through their dissolution as the result of migration 
or assimilation into other societies. But the point is that they have a life 
independent of the state, though typically interdependent with other soci-
eties. Society is not subsumed by the state. When Rawls said that society 
is a fair system of cooperation over time, from one generation to the 
next, he should perhaps have noted too that it is also a system of coop-
eration over geographic space, from one jurisdiction to the next. Society 
is what Hayek called the “extended order of human cooperation” (1991), 
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a system that does not end at political boundaries, but exists continuously 
in the vast network of individuals and groups who collaborate to produce 
and exchange the fruits of their labours.
While it is necessary to understand that society is a system (or, better, 
network) of cooperation, it is important to recognize the spontaneous 
character of much of that process, for only some of it takes place through 
deliberate political organization. Pevnick writes as though the institutions 
of public education, health-care provision, and pensions were political 
achievements, fostered and supported by an engaged citizenry. Yet all of 
these institutions have their origins not in political agreement but in the 
practical efforts of smaller communities to serve their own needs (Bar-
tholomew 2006). To a considerable extent, they have survived the devel-
opment of state-constructed alternatives, or the interventions of state-
mandated reforms. In many cases, problems with state-established 
schemes (e.g. for pensions) have led to privatization or de-nationalization 
or the emergence of parallel non-state institutions. In other cases, the 
state has struggled unsuccessfully to suppress institutions established by 
communities that have resisted efforts to standardize and control them.14
The general point towards which all this leads is that the idea that 
there is such a thing as a political community that owns its institutions and 
territory is implausible. What we have in reality is much more fluid and 
unstable. There is no doubt that states attempt to impose greater order 
upon the messy and variable character of society, and assert their owner-
ship of the society they claim to keep in their trust, and promote narra-
tives describing existing political orders in favourable terms. States require 
such narratives, no less than they need founding myths – such as those 
supplied in Locke’s defence of the Revolution Settlement in 1689, or by 
Lincoln in the Gettysburg Address that Pevnick quotes. But these stories 
are significant because of the purpose they serve or the function they 
perform, not because they are true.
Here it might be worth considering more closely one particular exam-
ple Pevnick offers to sharpen and defend his view. Malaya and Singapore 
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became independent countries in 1957 and 1958, but formed a union 
when Singapore joined the Federation of Malaysia in 1965. Disagreements 
between the leaders of the two countries, however, led quickly to separa-
tion, and within a year Singapore was on its own. Pevnick writes: “The 
country then embarked upon a project of national unification and eco-
nomic development that included a renewed commitment to education, 
the construction of an advanced infrastructure, and the recruitment of 
substantial foreign investment” (2011, 115). Such was Singapore’s success 
that by 2009 its per capita GDP was $49,228, while Malaysia’s was little 
over $14,000. In Pevnick’s assessment, “the development of Singapore 
was a triumph and the political community that generated these gains has 
at least some special entitlement to them” (2011, 115).
A number of things need to be noted here. First, it is misleading to 
say of Singapore that ‘the country embarked’ upon anything. The separa-
tion of the two states was the product of a squabble between two elites 
about how power should be shared. The policies pursued by Singapore 
were the policies favoured by its elites, often regardless of popular sup-
port. The same could be said of Malaysia. In neither case can it be said 
that the populace must take credit – or blame – for the course of eco-
nomic development. Second, the gains that have accrued to Singapore 
have been gains to individuals or groups in Singapore and there is no 
justification for depriving them of their wealth; but this does not warrant 
preventing others from participating in a system that is capable of gener-
ating such benefits, particularly if individual Singaporeans are willing to 
hire them, sell them goods, rent them property, or simply welcome them 
as friends.15 Third, even if Singaporeans have a right to the infrastructure 
that has been created, there is no reason to think that others joining the 
society will in any way diminish or destroy what they have built, or even 
give them a smaller share of the benefits that it brings. Indeed economic 
success in this case is attributable largely to the creation of an open, mar-
ket economy – one characterized above all by the ease of trading and 
doing business – of entering and participating in the life of civil society.16
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States try to impose order not only by controlling their historical nar-
ratives but also by controlling their boundaries. Immigration control is an 
important tool serving this end. Pevnick suggests that immigration con-
trol is justified because there is a pre-existing political community with 
interests it has every right to protect by excluding others from entering 
or participating in social life within its boundaries. But there is no such 
fixed community. It is a community that changes with the movement of 
peoples. What states have tried to do is fix the identity of that community 
by distinguishing people into categories, most generally into citizens and 
noncitizens, and then by making finer distinctions between different 
classes of residents, legal and illegal immigrants, refugees and asylum-
seekers. As Linda Bosniak notes, “The idea of citizenship is commonly 
invoked to convey a state of democratic belonging or inclusion, yet this 
inclusion is usually premised on a conception of community that is 
bounded and exclusive” (2006, 4). The purpose of fixing the boundaries 
of citizenship is to establish the political community.
Now it might be argued in response to this that while it may be true 
that the exclusion of others from membership or entry serves to create 
and define a political community, this in no way changes the fact that 
such a community exists. There is a process of construction and recon-
struction, but there is a political entity; and to it must accrue the right 
of self-definition, of self-determination. Here there are several responses 
to consider. First, the exercise of self-definition is only in a very weak 
sense a genuinely collective affair rather than one in which just a small 
segment of society participates. Conceptions of political community are 
elite constructions (Bras and Todd 2012). Second, to the extent that the 
said community has an independent existence, it would continue to do 
so regardless of who enters and leaves because the system of coopera-
tion exists independently of political boundaries and the rules delimiting 
who may live or work or associate within the boundaries of the state. 
Third, the state in reality has only a limited capacity to distinguish its 
citizens from noncitizens. Once people are in the country and make 
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lives for themselves, they are quite capable of integrating into society 
and living as members of their particular communities, or even as citi-
zens. The fact that they are illegal immigrants17 may not make much 
difference to them (unless caught)18 and makes no difference to the 
identity of the state.
This third point is worth dwelling upon a little further. Most theoriz-
ing about immigration and citizenship focuses on western liberal democ-
racies, which have highly developed systems of documentation to identify 
members of society, from birth to death. Even so, large numbers of 
illegal immigrants continue to live within their boundaries. In other parts 
of the world, however, such monitoring systems are only weakly devel-
oped and many countries play host to hundreds of thousands, or even 
millions, of residents whom the state is unable to identity, or of whose 
presence it is completely unaware. In such countries, illegal immigrants 
not only reside and work but also participate politically. In these cases 
they form what Kamal Sadiq has called “networks of complicity”, as they 
develop systems of cooperation that integrate silently into state bureau-
cracies and facilitate the securing of documentation and rights to enable 
members to operate in a society that requires evidence of some kind of 
legal status (Sadiq 2009).19 In time, many become citizens without states 
realizing what has happened, or how.
Although Pevnick wishes that borders were more open than they are 
today, particularly in the states of North America and Western Europe, 
he also wants to hold onto the principle that states are communities of 
citizens who have a collective right to determine who may enter or join 
their society. In doing so he is not claiming merely that states have the 
legal right to exclude (for they do, under international law20), or that they 
have the power to exclude (which they also do, as a matter of fact21), but 
that they have some other kind of fundamental (moral) right grounded in 
the right of every political community to self-determination. What I have 
tried to suggest is that this claim rests on very weak foundations. The 
entity he is describing, and to which he accords rights, does not exist.
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VI. IN DEFENCE OF OPEN BORDERS
Let me conclude with some general reflections on the case for open bor-
ders (see also Kukathas 2002; 2005). Most people, however sympathetic 
they might be to greater freedom of movement or simply to increased 
immigration, stop short of advocating (or agreeing to) open borders. 
Much of this may have to do with a conviction that, however open we 
might wish to be, the boundaries of the state ought to be policed and 
controlled. Ryan Pevnick’s careful study of justice in immigration is a 
good example of this. Borders ought to be controlled, but people ought 
to be treated justly in the process.
What I have tried to suggest here, however, is that we should aban-
don the aspiration to control the movement of people. We have no good 
justifications for doing so. We do, however, have good reason to be 
concerned about creating or maintaining institutions that facilitate it.
Arguments for controlling borders and the movement of people pre-
suppose the overwhelming importance of political community and, so, of 
the state. They tend to see the state as the source of order and, all too 
often, to describe economies as the products of their efforts. Yet while 
state institutions might be important for ensuring political stability, so 
that the costs of conflict between contending elites are controlled and the 
dangers of elite warfare are defused, states are not needed to sustain 
society – even if the actions of states can have an enormous bearing on 
the kind of society that develops.22 Society is the product of individual 
cooperation, not of state construction; it is made up of people, not work-
ers, or factors of production, or citizens.
Now one possible objection to this view is that, even if it rests on an 
understanding of the state that is more accurate, both historically and 
sociologically, the fact remains that the citizens of many, if not most, states 
willingly endorse its coercive institutions. Indeed, the citizens of many 
countries are suspicious of immigrants and in favour of their governments 
having the right and the readiness to control national borders. Even if the 
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reality of the state is as I have described it, the fiction that it is an expres-
sion of our collective self-determination, is one that is widely shared. If this 
is indeed the case, surely this gives us grounds for operating on the assump-
tion that the state is a kind of collective endeavour, and not just an instru-
ment of elite domination. This is an important consideration and answering 
it would take us further into questions about the nature of political society 
– questions I think that are ultimately inescapable. The preliminary answer 
I have to offer is to say that while it is indeed true that much of the general 
population buys into the fiction that the state is an expression of our capac-
ity for self-determination, it is a fiction all the same and a morally troubling 
one at that. The role of the theorist in these circumstances is not to either 
endorse or ignore the reality of this general outlook, but to offer a critique 
of an understanding, shared by other theorists and parts of the general 
public alike, which is seriously in need of rethinking.
There is no ethical foundation for the idea of controlled borders, nor 
any general benefit that comes with the development of institutions for 
controlling movement. The costs of control, however, are substantial. For 
to maintain a regime of controlled borders requires the construction and 
maintenance of a substantial system of general social control. This requires 
not only vast resource-consuming bureaucracies, but legions of monitors 
to police both the boundaries of the state and the activities of everyone 
– citizens and aliens alike. It means establishing a system of reporting to 
ensure not only that the wrong people do not enter the country, but also 
that those who do enter for one reason, do not act in ways reserved for 
some classes of persons and not others. This burden falls not so much on 
aliens as on residents and citizens who must comply not only with laws 
forbidding forms of associating, but regulations requiring them to prove 
that they have so complied. Controlling the movement and behaviour of 
foreigners is impossible without controlling the behaviour of everyone.
The corrupting effects of this are all too obvious. The threat of 
deportation makes people vulnerable to unscrupulous employers or dis-
gruntled neighbours. Employers are at the mercy of public officials, 
95922_EthPersp_2012/4_03_Kukathas.indd   670 22/11/12   13:26
— 671 —
Ethical Perspectives 19 (2012) 4
CHANDRAN KUKATHAS – WHY OPEN BORDERS?
particularly since immigration controls are notoriously under-enforced: 
since not all illegal immigrants can be deported without causing great 
upheaval in local economies, officials must exercise discretion in distin-
guishing those to be targeted for prosecution from those to be left 
alone. The criminalization of immigration threatens to foster greater 
criminality (Furman et al. 2012).
Controlled borders are frequently defended in the name of protecting 
the interests and rights of citizens against the dangers posed by an unman-
aged or excessive influx of foreigners. In Pevnick’s analysis, the ultimate 
justification is that this is consistent with, and perhaps even enables, a 
people’s self-determination. The irony is that a regime founded on a right 
to control its borders has to be a regime with the right to control its 
population. To present this as a form of self-determination worth defend-
ing is curious to say the least.23
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NOTES
1. This is not to deny that there are border disputes between countries, as well as disputes 
over particular territories laid claim to by different states. 
2. For a different perspective see Anderson, Sharma and Wright (2009, 5-18). Their article 
defends a case for a borderless world as a practical political project. Though I am very sympathetic 
to this viewpoint, I will confine myself here to a discussion of ethics for a world of states and borders. 
3. I leave out of this discussion the obvious point that the openness of a border depends 
also on the extent to which people within its jurisdictions are permitted to leave. 
4. The magnitude of the estimates depend very much on the assumptions made; hence the 
wide range in the figures quoted. However, as Clemens notes, even conservative assumptions yield 
estimates of substantial gains in wealth. This does not mean that everyone will gain, or that the 
distribution of gains will be equitable, for much will depend on local factors, institutional con-
straints, the skills of migrants, and so on. 
5. Chandy and Gertz estimate that even with the success of some current strategies to reduce 
world poverty, there would still be 600 million people living on less than $1.25 a day in 2015 
(2011, 18).  
6. For an argument in defence of freedom of movement emphasizing the wrong of coercing 
– and so, violating the rights of – immigrants, see Huemer (2010). 
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7. In the United States, some research suggests that while immigration does depress the 
wages of the worst-off in the domestic labour force, this burden is borne primarily by the previous 
generation of immigrants. If this is so, the case for restricting migration on domestic equity 
grounds weakens, since the grounds for restricting immigration would be that it protects (mainly) 
the preceding cohort of immigrants. 
8. These are arguments Stephen Macedo turns to in his own treatment of the immigra-
tion issue. 
9. For an attempt to defend immigration restrictions on such grounds see Samuel Hunting-
ton (2004). The challenge facing Huntington, however, is that in claiming that Mexican immigra-
tion threatens the Protestant cultural identity of the United States he opens up the question of 
whether preserving that identity might require restricting immigration from other cultural regions. 
10. The reference is to the Lincoln of the Gettysburg Address. 
11. In the last years of the Soviet Union the following joke circulated in the geriatric wards 
of Leningrad hospitals. An official survey required patients to answer four questions: where we 
you born, where did you grow up, where do you live now, and where would you like to be? 
Patients everywhere answered: St Petersburg, Petrograd, Leningrad, St Petersburg (the name St 
Petersburg was restored by popular vote on the day of the first Russian presidential election on 
June 12, 1991, though even then with only 54% support.) 
12. For an interesting history see Davies (2011). 
13. The two special areas are the Åland Islands and Svalbard, which are special territories of 
Finland and Norway respectively, but have political arrangements that were settled through inter-
national agreements. 
14. Here the history of state education is instructive. See, for example, West (1970); Lee 
(2011); Tooley (2009). 
15. It is worth noting that Singapore in fact has unusually open borders – open not only to 
the movement of goods but also to people. Aside from the large numbers of Malaysians working 
in Singapore (some driving daily across the causeway that joins the island to the Malaysian pen-
insula), some 20 per cent of the population is made up of foreigners. This is not to say that it has 
no immigration controls. While it is easy for most people to enter the country, and very easy for 
skilled migrants to obtain permission to work and reside, unskilled labour is more tightly regu-
lated, and the government retains the right to expel. However, compared with most states, Singa-
pore has an economy that is very open to the movement of people. 
16. Singapore consistently ranks second, behind Hong Kong, on the Index of Economic 
Freedom. 
17. Though some scholars object to the term ‘illegal’ immigrant, I follow Pevnick’s usage 
(2011, 165-183). 
18. I do not wish to suggest that being unauthorized is of no consequence. Everything here 
depends on the nature of immigration laws and their enforcement, as well as on the aspirations 
of the individual. For someone who hopes to make a permanent life in the United States, being 
unauthorized is a life-shaping burden. The point is that membership of a state, or citizenship, or 
permanent residence status for that matter, are not important in themselves, but only become 
significant because of immigration controls.  
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19. This is a particularly important study that challenges not only received understandings 
of illegal immigration, but also standard views of citizenship. 
20. Though this right is not unqualified, depending upon a state’s membership of inter-
national organizations or participation in international regimes, such as the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. 
21. Though this power is not complete, since its exercise is not costless and no state is will-
ing to devote the resources necessary to ensure high levels of success. Complete success is, in any 
case, unattainable. 
22. I recognized that here a complicated analysis is called for. The key figure in political 
theory in this case is Montesquieu. 
23. I wish to thank Liza Schuster, Lea Ypi and two anonymous reviewers for helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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